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Decisions require careful weighing of the risks and benefits associated with a choice. Some people need to be offered large rewards to
balance even minimal risks, whereas others take great risks in the hope for an only minimal benefit. We show here that risk-taking is a
modifiable behavior that depends on right hemisphere prefrontal activity. We used low-frequency, repetitive transcranial magnetic
stimulation to transiently disrupt left or right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) function before applying a well known gambling
paradigm that provides a measure of decision-making under risk. Individuals displayed significantly riskier decision-making after
disruption of the right, but not the left, DLPFC. Our findings suggest that the right DLPFC plays a crucial role in the suppression of
superficially seductive options. This confirms the asymmetric role of the prefrontal cortex in decision-making and reveals that this
fundamental human capacity can be manipulated in normal subjects through cortical stimulation. The ability to modify risk-taking
behavior may be translated into therapeutic interventions for disorders such as drug abuse or pathological gambling.
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Introduction
The ability to make correct decisions in a complex and changing
environment requires careful weighing of risks and benefits. The
prefrontal cortex (PFC) appears to be critical in such decision-
making processes. Decision-making behavior in adolescents,
generally more risk-taking in nature, is thought to be the mani-
festation of an immature prefrontal cortex (Chambers et al.,
2003), and patients with traumatic brain injuries or other pathol-
ogies affecting the PFC show a tendency for riskier, “out-of-
character” decision-making and an apparent disregard for nega-
tive consequences of their actions (Bechara et al., 1996; Rahman
et al., 2001). This seems particularly true for patients with right-
sided lesions (Tranel et al., 2002; Clark et al., 2003), although still
little is known about the lateralization of the neural mechanisms
involved in decision-making. Some functional imaging studies
suggest that the right prefrontal cortexmay be particularly critical
for the regulation of risk-taking behavior (Rogers et al., 1999;
Ernst et al., 2002; Fishbein et al., 2005). However, these studies do
not provide a direct causal link between structure and function.
We used repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation (rTMS) to
transiently disrupt left or right prefrontal function and thus ex-
amine whether risk-taking strategies can be modified in healthy
individuals and provide direct evidence for the causal role of
lateralized hemispheric control of risk-taking.
Materials andMethods
Subjects.We studied 27 right-handed men (mean age, 23.8 years; range,
21–31 years). All provided written informed consent to participate in the
study that had been approved by the local ethics committee. All were
naive to TMS and had no history of psychiatric illness or neurological
disorders. Subjects received 80CHF (Swiss francs) for their participation.
They were randomly assigned to either left or right prefrontal rTMS or
sham stimulation. There was no difference between groups with respect
to age (F(2,24)  1.64; p  0.215). No subject reported any adverse side
effects concerning pain on the scalp or headaches after the experiment.
Risk task. Subjects were randomly assigned to receive sham or verum
rTMS to the left or the right dorsolateral PFC (DLPFC) before perform-
ing the Risk Task (Rogers et al., 1999), a well known gambling paradigm
that provides ameasure of decision-making under riskwith little require-
ments on strategy andworkingmemory. In each of the 100 trials, subjects
were presentedwith six horizontally arranged boxes that could be pink or
blue (Fig. 1). The ratio of pink and blue boxes varied from trial to trial
and could be 5:1, 4:2, or 3:3. Subjects had to pick the color of the box that
hid the “winning token.” They were told that the token was equally likely
to be hidden in any of the boxes. Therefore, for each trial, the ratio of pink
to blue boxes (referred to as “level of risk”) effectively determined the
probability of finding that winning token and thus the level of risk of
the choice. Subjects were rewarded with points for picking the color of
the box hiding the winning token and punished by loosing points for
picking the incorrect color. The amount of reward (or penalty) points
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associated with any one scenario (for example, five blue and one pink
box) varied (90:10, 80:20, 70:30, 60:40; referred to as “balance of re-
ward”) and was indicated in the bottom two boxes on the screen (Fig. 1).
The larger reward (and penalty) was always associated with choice of the
high-risk prospect (i.e., the lower likelihood to obtain the winning out-
come, whichwas the color with the fewest number of boxes), whereas the
smallest reward (and penalty) was associated with choice of the low-risk
prospect. Thus, in a trial with five blue boxes and one pink box (supple-
mental Fig. 1, available at www.jneurosci.org as supplemental material),
the winning token was muchmore likely to be hidden in a blue box (5 in
6 probability) than in the lone pink box (1 in 6 probability). In this case,
if the subject picked pink and was correct, she would be awarded the
number of points indicated in the lower pink box, whichwould always be
greater than the points associated with the choice of blue. Conversely,
picking pink and missing the winning token would result in a loss of the
same, larger number of points. Subjects’ aim was to earn as many points
as possible.
Transcranial magnetic stimulation. rTMS was administered to the
DLPFC before subjects performed the task (“off-line paradigm”) (Fig. 1)
using a Magstim (Rapid Magnetic Stimulator; Magstim, Winchester,
MA) and figure-of-eight coil (70-mm-diameter double circle, air
cooled). The position of the DLPFC was defined as 6 cm anterior to the
motor cortex, at the same lateral distance along the convexity from the
midsagittal plane as the handmotor representation. A T1-weightedmag-
netic resonance imaging (MRI) with vitamin E capsules placed on the
previously marked TMS target positions (Fig. 1) was acquired for all
subjects who received verum stimulation to confirm the proper position-
ing of the TMS coil. The coil was positioned tangentially to the scalp
pointing in an anteromedial direction, 45° from the midsagittal axis of
the subject’s head. Stimulation intensity was set at 100%of the individual
resting motor threshold (MT), as determined following current guide-
lines. Groups of subjects did not differ with respect to MT (t(16) 0.68;
p 0.634). In the left hemisphere (right hand), the MT was 37–50% of
maximal stimulator output, and, for the right hemisphere (left hand), the
MT was 35–52% of maximal stimulator output. Subjects received a sin-
gle, 15 min, 1 Hz rTMS train (900 pulses) over the left DLPFC or right
DLPFC or received sham stimulation (counterbalanced over the left and
right DLPFC). These rTMS parameters are well within currently recom-
mended guidelines (Wassermann, 1998) and result in a suppression of
excitability of the targeted cortical region for several minutes after com-
pletion of the rTMS train (Robertson et al., 2003).
Statistical analysis. Principal measures of interest were the percentage
of instances in which subjects chose the high-probability option (the
color corresponding to more boxes) and the time it took the subjects to
make the choice of a color. We refer to the first as “percentage choice of
the low-risk prospect” and to the second as “decision times.” Perfor-
mance on the entire task of 100 trials with the exception of neutral risk
scenarios (i.e., equal number of blue and pink boxes) was analyzed. For
statistical analyses, the proportion of trials on which subjects chose the
low-risk prospect was arcsine transformed, as is recommendedwhenever
the variance is proportional to the mean (Howell, 1997). For simplicity,
the data on percentage choice of the low-risk prospect shown in the
figures represent untransformed values. The two principlemeasures (i.e.,
percentage choice of the low-risk prospect and decision times) were sub-
jected to three-way repeated-measures ANOVA with group (right TMS,
left TMS, sham) as between-subject factor and level of risk (5:1, 4:2) and
balance of reward (90:10, 80:20, 70:30, 60:40) as within-subject factors.
There was no time limit for subjects’ responses, but trials with outlier
reaction times, i.e., slower or faster than 2 SDs of the individual mean,
were discarded from the analysis. Moreover, to test differences in deci-
sion time between “risky” and “safe” decisions, we computed a two-way
ANOVA with group (right TMS, left TMS, sham) as between-subject
factor and quality of decision (safe, risky) as within-subject factor. Five
subjects (four left TMS, one sham) were not included in this analysis
because they made no risky choices. To compare the effect of rTMS on
mood, we conducted a two-way repeated-measures ANOVA with group
(right TMS, left TMS, sham) as between-subject factor and test session
(before TMS, after TMS) as within-subject factor. Differences between
groups in the total timeneeded to complete the task (100 trials) and in the
total score (100 trials) were tested with a one-way ANOVA with group
(right TMS, left TMS, sham) as between-subject factor.When justified by
the ANOVA analysis, significant effects were further analyzed by Schef-
fe´’s test. Differences were considered statistically significant at p 0.05.
Results
All subjects performed the task well, completing all trials in 7
min regardless of TMS condition (F(2,24) 1.10; p 0.350) and
showing the expected influence of risk and balance of reward on
decision speed (supplemental Fig. 2, available at www.jneurosci.
org as supplemental material). However, the number of points
earned was significantly dependent on the stimulation condition
(Fig. 2a). Subjects stimulated over the right DLPFC earned sig-
nificantly less points and weremore likely to choose the high-risk
prospect than subjects in the other study groups (Fig. 2b). For all
subjects, the percentage of conservative (safe) decisions increased
significantly as the reward decreased for the high-risk prospect
(Fig. 2c). This and the lack of significant interaction between
group and balance of reward (Fig. 2c) reveals that the subjects’
tendency to select riskier options after right DLPFC rTMSmight
be better interpreted as a relative insensitivity to risk than as a
heightened sensitivity to reward.
Discussion
There are several reasons that could account for the disadvanta-
geous, risky decision-making after right prefrontal stimulation.
Figure1. Experimental design. Subjects received 1Hz rTMSduring 15min (b). The position-
ing of the coil over the left or right DLPFC was confirmed for all subjects using a three-
dimensional MRI sequence with vitamin E capsule in place (sample shows right DLPFC). Four
trials of the Risk Task are shown in d. Subjects performed all 100 trials in7 min. The ratio of
pink and blue boxes changed from trial to trial, and this is referred to in the text as level of risk.
The numbers inside the bottom two boxes depict the reward/punishment sizes associatedwith
the respective colors, in the text referred to as balance of reward. Reward associatedwith either
choice of box color was fixed (10 vs 90, 20 vs 80, 30 vs 70, and 40 vs 60); the larger reward (and
penalty)wasassociatedwith choiceof thehigh-riskprospect,whereas the smallest reward (and
penalty) was associated with the choice of the low-risk prospect, providing inherent reward
conflict typical of risk-taking situations. The subject’s task was to select one of these boxes to
indicate the color of the box thought to hide a winning token (not shown in the samples).
Subjects had to rate their mood before (a) and immediately after (c) the rTMS train.
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First, happy individuals tend to overestimate the likelihood of
positive and underestimate the likelihood of negative outcomes
of events (Johnson and Tversky, 1983). Therefore, the enhanced
readiness to display risky behavior after right PFC rTMS could be
attributable to an increase in happiness induced by rTMS (Ger-
shon et al., 2003). However, we assessed subjects’ mood before
and after stimulation using visual analog scales and found them
to be independent of the hemisphere stimulated. ANOVA of
group  test session (before TMS, after TMS) revealed only a
main effect for test session (F(2,24) 15.38; p 0.001). Stimula-
tion over the left and right DLPFC significantly altered mood
toward less “happy,” but all three groups rated their mood as still
positive.
Second, in accordance with the somatic marker hypothesis
(Damasio, 1996; Bechara and Damasio, 2005), right PFC rTMS
could have affected the detection or processing of marker signals
that arise in bioregulatory processes and guide decision-making.
The ventromedial PFC, particularly on the right (Critchley et al.,
2000), is indeed believed to play a crucial role in the interpreta-
tion and regulation of such bodily sensations. However, the so-
matic marker hypothesis was formulated in the framework of
experiments on the Iowa Gambling Task, which measures
decision-making under ambiguity rather than risk. Decision-
making under ambiguity does not allow for a fast cost–benefit
analysis guided by simple rules. Consecutive outcomes can only
be guessed by gradually learning the pattern of reward and pun-
ishment associated with specific options. In contrast, in the Risk
Task, event probabilities are always explicitly given, learning is
minimized, and guidance by any markers is likely less critical for
effective performance.
We propose that what is primarily needed in the Risk Task is
an active suppression of an option that appears most seductive
because of the immediate higher payoffs. However, this inclina-
tion is balanced by control mechanisms sensitive to the negative
consequences of high losses. Our results demonstrate that sup-
pression of the right, but not the left, PFC by rTMS reduces
inhibitory control, leading to overly risky
decision-making. A potential objection to
any account in terms of inhibition is that
orbital rather than dorsal areas of the PFC
are traditionally implicated in inhibitory
control functions. However, orbitofrontal
and dorsolateral prefrontal structures are
densely interconnected (Ghashghaei and
Barbas, 2002), and stimulation of one
leads to coactivations of the other (Li et al.,
2004; Knoch et al., 2006). We hypothesize
that DLPFC rTMS affected orbitofrontal
cortex. and such distal impact accounts for
the observed behavioral effects. Impor-
tantly, TMS over the right PFC did not in-
fluence decision times and certainly not in
a way that could be interpreted as reflect-
ing an especially hasty behavior. ANOVA
of group quality of decision (safe, risky)
revealed no main effect for group (F(2,19)
 0.44; p  0.651) but a main effect for
quality of decision. Safe decisions were
faster than risky decisions (F(1,19) 45.52;
p  0.001). Specifically, the observation
that, in all groups, risky choices took
longer than safe choices speaks against a
disinhibition at motor level.
Therefore, we conclude that the right (not the left) PFC plays
a crucial role in the suppressive control of superficially seductive
options. This is consistent with findings of preferential right-
hemisphere involvement for inhibitory control of behavior in
go/no-go paradigms (Garavan et al., 1999; Aron et al., 2003) and
with clinical evidence suggesting a preferential right hemispheric
lateralization of syndromes, such as drug abuse or nonsubstance
addictions, in which impairments of decision-making seem to
reflect a breakdown of these control processes (Starkstein and
Robinson, 1997). Indeed, the demonstrated TMS-induced “ap-
petite for risk” resembles that reported previously for drug abus-
ers’ behavior (Fishbein et al., 2005), which suggests a failure in
self-regulation (Lieberman and Eisenberger, 2004) or a deficient
reflective system (Bechara, 2005) or “cool” system (Metcalfe and
Mischel, 1999). It is tempting to speculate whether high-
frequency (i.e., 10–20 Hz), instead of low-frequency, rTMS over
the right PFC would diminish, rather than increase, subjects’ risk
behavior. In a recent experiment (Knoch et al., 2005), we manip-
ulated the naturally occurring inhibition of an automatized habit
by rTMS over the PFC and either suppressed or released habitual
responses depending on stimulation frequencies. Consistentwith
this notion, in cocaine addicts, pilot data suggest that targeting
the right, but not the left, DLPFC with 20 Hz rTMS leads to a
significant suppression of craving (A. J. Camprodon, J.Martinez-
Raga, and A. Pascual-Leone, unpublished observations). The ob-
served laterality effect in our study is also compatible with the
view that the right PFC is particularly sensitive to punishments or
negative events (Davidson, 2004; Bechara and Damasio, 2005).
On this account, inhibition of this area produced a selective ne-
glect for negative consequences.
It is important to note that we provided our subjects with no
monetary compensation for points accumulated during the task.
Instead, subjects were paid a set compensation amount for their
participation in the study. The fact that nomonetary significance
was attached to the points accumulated by the end of the task
could be perceived as a limitation, given that there is a lack of
Figure 2. a, Total points earned in 100 trials (means SEM). One-way ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of group
(F(2,24) 5.60; p 0.011). Subjects stimulated over the right DLPFC earned significantly fewer points than those who received
sham( p0.040) or the left DLPFCwho received real rTMS ( p0.020).b, Percentage choice of the low-risk prospect (means
SEM) for all three groups. Repeated-measures ANOVAof subject group level of risk balance of reward revealed amain effect
of group (F(2,24) 4.92; p 0.016), and post hoc analysis demonstrated that subjects who received rTMS over the right DLPFC
were more likely to choose the high-risk prospect than those stimulated over the left DLPFC ( p 0.034) or those who received
sham rTMS ( p 0.048). Indeed, seven of nine subjectswho received right DLPFC rTMSultimately performed among the subjects
more prone to risk-taking, whereas most of those who received left DLPFC rTMS ended up in the group of subjects who were less
inclined toward risk-taking. c, Percentage choice of the low-risk prospect (means SEM) as a function of the balance of reward.
Repeated-measures ANOVA of subject group level of risk balance of reward revealed a main effect of balance of reward
(F(3,72) 17.19; p 0.001). No interaction between group and balance of reward was found (F(6,72) 1.03; p 0.414).
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incentive for subjects to do well during the game. However, most
other studies using similar tasks also do not provide monetary
rewards (Rogers et al., 1999; Manes et al., 2002; Clark et al., 2003;
Fishbein et al., 2005). Given the findings of significant group
performance differences in the hypothesized direction in this and
other studies, this is likely not a cause for our results.
In summary, we show that risky decision-making engages a
predominantly right-lateralized neural network, suggesting that
adaptive decision-making depends on the degree of activation of
right-sided prefrontal structures. In real-life scenarios, the sub-
stantial differences among individuals in risk pronenessmay cor-
respond to different levels of activity in the right prefrontal cor-
tex. The higher this level, the lower one’s appetite for risk. If this
turns out to be true, high-frequency rTMS could be used to in-
crease activity of the right PFC in a therapeutic framework to
enhance cognitive control and adaptive decision-making.
References
AronAR, Fletcher PC, Bullmore ET, Sahakian BJ, Robbins TW (2003) Stop-
signal inhibition disrupted by damage to right inferior frontal gyrus in
humans. Nat Neurosci 6:115–116.
BecharaA (2005) Decisionmaking, impulse control and loss ofwillpower to
resist drugs: a neurocognitive perspective. Nat Neurosci 8:1458–1463.
Bechara A, Damasio AR (2005) The somatic marker hypothesis: a neural
theory of economic decision. Games Econ Behav 52:336–372.
Bechara A, Tranel D, Damasio H, Damasio AR (1996) Failure to respond
automatically to anticipated future outcomes following damage to pre-
frontal cortex. Cereb Cortex 6:215–225.
Chambers RA, Taylor JR, Potenza MN (2003) Developmental neurocir-
cuitry of motivation in adolescence: a critical period of addiction vulner-
ability. Am J Psychiatry 160:1041–1052.
Clark L, Manes F, Antoun N, Sahakian BJ, Robbins TW (2003) The contri-
butions of lesion laterality and lesion volume to decision-making impair-
ment following frontal lobe damage. Neuropsychologia 41:1474–1483.
Critchley HD, Elliot R, Mathias CJ, Dolan RJ (2000) Neural activity relating
to generation and representation of galvanic skin conductance responses:
a functionalmagnetic resonance imaging study. JNeurosci 20:3033–3040.
Damasio AR (1996) The somatic marker hypothesis and the possible func-
tions of the prefrontal cortex. Proc Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci
351:1413–1420.
Davidson RJ (2004) What the prefrontal cortex “do” in affect: perspectives
on frontal EEG asymmetry research. Biol Psychol 67:219–233.
ErnstM, Bolla K,MouratidisM, Contoreggi C,Matochik JA, KurianV, Cadet
JL, Kimes AS, London ED (2002) Decision-making in a risk-taking task:
a PET study. Neuropsychopharmacology 26:682–691.
Fishbein DH, Eldreth DL, Hyde C, Matochik JA, London ED, Contoreggi C,
Kurian V, Kimes AS, Breeden A, Grant S (2005) Risky decision making
and the anterior cingulate cortex in abstinent drug abusers and nonusers.
Cognit Brain Res 23:119–136.
Garavan H, Ross TJ, Stein EA (1999) Right hemispheric dominance of in-
hibitory control: an event-related functional MRI study. Proc Natl Acad
Sci USA 96:8301–8306.
Gershon AA, Dannon PN, Grunhaus L (2003) Transcranial magnetic stim-
ulation in the treatment of depression. Am J Psychiatry 160:835–845.
Ghashghaei HT, Barbas H (2002) Pathways for emotion: interactions of
prefrontal and anterior temporal pathways in the amygdala of the rhesus
monkey. Neuroscience 115:1261–1279.
Howell DC (1997) Statistical methods for psychology. Belmont, CA:
Duxbury.
Johnson E, Tversky A (1983) Affect, generalization, and the perception of
risk. J Pers Soc Psychol 36:20–31.
Knoch D, Brugger P, Regard M (2005) Suppressing vs. releasing a habit:
frequency-dependent effects of prefrontal transcranial magnetic stimula-
tion. Cereb Cortex 15:885–887.
Knoch D, Treyer V, RegardM,Mu¨ri R, Buck A,Weber B (2006) Lateralized
and frequency dependent effects of prefrontal rTMS on regional cerebral
blood flow. NeuroImage 31:641–648.
Li X,Nahas Z, Kozel FA, AndersonB, BohningDE,GeorgeMS (2004) Acute
left prefrontal transcranial magnetic stimulation in depressed patients is
associated with immediately increased activity in prefrontal cortical as
well as subcortical regions. Biol Psychiatry 55:882–890.
LiebermanMD, Eisenberger N (2004) Conflict and habit: a social cognitive
neuroscience approach to the self. In: On building, defending and regu-
lating the self: a psychological perspective (Tesser A,Wood JV, Stapel DA,
eds), pp 77–102. New York: Psychology Press.
Manes F, Sahakian B, Clark L, Rogers R, Antoun N, Aitken M, Robbins T
(2002) Decision-making processes following damage to the prefrontal
cortex. Brain 125:624–639.
Metcalfe J, Mischel WA (1999) Hot/cool-system analysis of delay gratifica-
tion: dynamics of willpower. Psychol Rev 106:3–19.
Rahman S, Sahakian BJ, Cardinal RN, Rogers RD, Robbins TW (2001) De-
cision making and neuropsychiatry. Trends Cogn Sci 5:271–277.
Robertson EM, Theoret H, Pascual-Leone A (2003) Studies in cognition:
the problems solved and created by transcranial magnetic stimulation. J
Cogn Neurosci 15:948–960.
Rogers RD, Owen AM,Middleton HC,Williams EJ, Pickard JD, Sahakian BJ,
Robbins TW (1999) Choosing between small, likely rewards and large,
unlikely rewards activates inferior and orbital prefrontal cortex. J Neuro-
sci 19:9029–9038.
Starkstein SE, Robinson RG (1997) Mechanisms of disinhibition after brain
lesion. J Nerv Ment Dis 185:108–114.
Tranel D, Bechara A, Denburg NL (2002) Asymmetric functional roles of
right and left ventromedial prefrontal cortices in social conduct, decision-
making, and emotional processing. Cortex 38:589–612.
Wassermann EM (1998) Risk and safety of repetitive transcranial magnetic
stimulation. Electroencephalogr Clin Neurophysiol 108:1–16.
6472 • J. Neurosci., June 14, 2006 • 26(24):6469–6472 Knoch et al. • Right Prefrontal Cortex and Risk-Taking Behavior
